Why Cutting U.S. Troops in Europe Risks Repeating Past Mistakes

A member of a U.S. Army tank crew sits in his M1 Abrams main battle tank as it participates in the U.S. Army Europe and Africa International Tank Challenge on February 11, 2025 at Grafenwoehr, Germany. (Photo by Sean Gallup/Getty Images)

One of the biggest mistakes of my career wasn’t something I did. It was something I failed to prevent.

I was commander of U.S. Army Europe in the early 2010s when U.S. forces were being drawn down in the European theater. I argued—forcefully, with members of Congress, the administration, the Department of Defense, and even my military commanders—that we shouldn’t do it. In the final throes of the discussion, I pleaded to keep just one more tank brigade combat team on the continent. Those tanks, armored vehicles, and supporting forces would have signaled to our allies—and to our foe, Putin—our presence and commitment.

I believed then, as I do now, that removing that force created an opportunity for Russia to test the NATO alliance and to pursue its longstanding objective of expanding its influence. I wasn’t persuasive enough. My arguments fell on deaf ears, and the brigade’s soldiers were ordered to return to the United States. Not long after, Russia seized Crimea and invaded Ukraine’s Donbas region.

I won’t claim that the decisions of those who were my superiors caused that aggression—but I believe it contributed to it.

I remember a warning from the then-president of Georgia, Mikheil Saakashvili, who told me plainly that if we pulled that kind of capability out of Europe, Moscow would act. He was right.

I still question myself as to how I could have been more persuasive.

Echoes of the Past: A New Troop Reduction Proposal

On Friday night, when I heard that Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth announced a reduction of 5,000 U.S. troops in Europe—based on what he called a “thorough review”—but more likely because of President Donald Trump’s retribution against German Chancellor Friedrich Merz for his recent comments about the war in Iran—I hear an echo of the argument from more than a decade ago. And I worry we are about to make an even bigger mistake.

Lessons from the Last Major Troop Drawdown in Europe

I would like to see the Department of Defense’s “thorough review.” Because I was part of a similar one conducted over a decade ago. I helped plan and later execute the last major transformation of U.S. Army forces in Europe—one that took that force from 90,000 troops to about 34,000 between 2004 and 2012.

That wasn’t a decision made quickly or casually. It took years of analysis, coordination, and constant negotiation across governments, services, and commands. It required aligning troop movements with deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan to avoid tearing apart families and units. It involved extensive consultation with host nations such as Germany and Italy, where political, legal, and economic considerations were as important as military considerations. It required detailed planning for base closures, infrastructure consolidation, and