Paramount-Warner Bros Deal Faces Scrutiny Over Foreign Investments and CFIUS Review Risks

An aerial view of the Paramount logo on the water tower at Paramount Studios on December 8, 2025, in Los Angeles, California. (Mario Tama/Getty Images)

Earlier this week, a discussion with Catherine Rampell highlighted how the FCC is being leveraged both to challenge opponents of Donald Trump—such as through FCC Chair Brendan Carr’s demand for ABC to renew broadcast licenses over jokes by Jimmy Kimmel—and to assist allies by waiving rules that limit foreign ownership in U.S. broadcast companies to 25%.

Paramount-Warner Bros. Merger Faces CFIUS Scrutiny

One key topic was the likelihood of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) reviewing the $111 billion Paramount-Warner Bros. merger, given that nearly half of the capital comes from Middle Eastern sovereign funds and other foreign sources.

In its 2025 SEC filing, Paramount argued that a CFIUS review is unnecessary for two reasons:

• The sovereign wealth funds involved will have no governance role in the merged company, despite holding 38.5% of the equity. This means they won’t have official voting power over business decisions. (Unofficial influence over news coverage, such as on CNN or CBS, remains a separate concern.)
• Tencent, a Chinese company, is no longer a financing partner in the deal.

Tencent’s Lingering Role Raises Concerns

Even with Tencent’s removal as a direct equity source, the company’s prior investments in Skydance—the entity that merged with Paramount last year—remain a point of contention. Tencent reportedly held 10% of Skydance and 5% of the merged entity, making it a passive investor in the new conglomerate.

This involvement has drawn criticism, particularly from Sens. Elizabeth Warren and Cory Booker, who argued in a letter requesting a full CFIUS review:

The fact that Tencent withdrew and has reportedly re-entered at a lower dollar amount does not eliminate the CFIUS question—it underscores it. If anything, the pattern of withdrawal and re-entry—each time at a level designed to stay below the jurisdictional threshold—is itself potential evidence that the transaction’s foreign capital structure is being managed to evade review.